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  Support from executive management must be unrelenting. The various minority internships sponsored by the Bureau need to be increased and new, and innovative recruiting techniques, borrowed from the private sector, need to be employed. During my tenure, we reached out through several special interest groups representing minority communities, and we employed 15 and 30-second radio spots during drive time on urban radio stations in many cities. We produced billboards featuring diverse special agents, placing them in urban areas throughout the country, and we even used the marketing talents of the New York Times to attempt to reach new, diverse talent.

  Additionally, the FBI must continue to reach out to young people. While I was Section Chief, we started a project wherein we visited colleges and universities with significant minority populations and sponsored semester-long marketing classes in which the students developed plans for marketing the FBI on campus, and then did so. That effort introduced the FBI to many individuals who had not previously considered the FBI as a career choice. The program, the brainchild of EdVenture Partners, an Oninda, California company, was spearheaded by then Acting Unit Chief Gwen Hubbard. It is an innovative program, and in the long run, should produce a more diverse agent population.

  The import of counterterrorism investigations should in itself drive home the necessity of a more diverse workforce. The issue is so critical that a full-time FBI Diversity Officer position should be created. (If it hasn’t been already.) That Diversity Officer should be someone with demonstrated success in the private sector and with knowledge of the cutting-edge methods being used by the corporate world to recruit a dynamic and diverse workforce. And, most importantly, the recruits must be of the same high caliber that the public has come to be expect from the FBI for over 75 years.

  One area of focus for the new Diversity Officer would be the relationship the FBI has with members of the Middle Eastern American community. The FBI needs to join with civic leaders within the Middle Eastern communities throughout the U.S. to recruit Middle Eastern Americans into the FBI. That’s where the Bureau will find the cultural familiarity and the language specialists the FBI so desperately needs. That’s where the seeds can be planted with young Middle Eastern Americans so that, down the road, they may consider a career as an FBI agent or professional support person. Recruiting from these communities would ultimately lead to a greater intelligence base.

  The nature of the many investigations following 9/11 caused a rift between the FBI and many in the Muslim community. In most FBI Field Offices, prior to 9/11, there simply wasn’t much interaction between the FBI and the Muslim community because, generally speaking, Muslim children are raised in strict homes and seldom are in trouble with the law. When the FBI suddenly had to interact frequently with Muslim communities in the U.S., liaisons in many of those communities were not already established. It was akin to two unknown groups meeting for the first time. Many Muslim Americans became paranoid – sometimes justifiably concerned -- as many other Americans suddenly perceived them as suspects.

  While in Mississippi, I saw instances where even being a suspected Muslim could get you in trouble. A Sikh storeowner was threatened and had bricks thrown through his store window because he “looked Muslim.” An Israeli college student who had been locked up for an immigration violation was assaulted in jail because he looked like a “terrorist.” There was clearly reason for paranoia in people of color who appeared Middle Eastern.

  Today, in order to help identify the Muslims in the U.S. who would do harm to our nation, good liaison with the Muslim community must be an ongoing priority.

  The FBI’s need to be diverse and to be able to develop rapport with all people couldn’t be greater.

  CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

  SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

  In November 2003, having received great support from Assistant Director Mark Bullock and Executive Assistant Director Grant Ashley, Director Mueller appointed me Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Jacksonville Division. I had worked hard and had my fair share of success during my 20 years in the Bureau, but I was still amazed to be receiving an appointment to lead one of the Bureau’s 56 Field Offices.

  The career path that led to the SAC position had required considerable moving around the country for my family and me as I had moved up the managerial ladder. It wasn’t always easy on my wife, Rosa, or our three sons. Michael, my oldest son, had to move from Houston to the DC area between his sophomore and junior years in high school. My middle son, Daniel, had to move after his sophomore year from Maryland to Arizona. Johnny, my youngest, had to move from the DC area to Mississippi after his freshman year in high school. Those moves weren’t easy. They’ve all prospered as adults, but I know those high school year moves were rough.

  But I sure was happy to be named and quickly tackled a myriad of new challenges. The learning curve wasn’t too bad. While observing some of the SACs for whom I worked, I took note of what I considered smart SAC traits. These outstanding SACs, while maintaining command and control over their territory, worked in a collaborative way within the division. They clearly recognized the tremendous talent they had around them and took advantage of that talent when making decisions. As a result, they made informed decisions, which normally resonated well with the troops in the office and were in the best interest of the Bureau. While I wasn’t always successful, I tried to emulate them, realizing that I really was surrounded by incredibly talented men and women.

  Throughout my two years as SAC, I worked to collaborate, to get out among the people in the office and take advantage of their knowledge and insights. In the end, I had to make the decisions myself, but I always tried to make logical and informed calls.

  The Jacksonville Division includes resident agencies (satellite offices) in the Florida communities of Daytona Beach, Ocala, Gainesville, Tallahassee, Fort Walton Beach, Panama City, and Pensacola. Those last three are in the Central Time Zone. While SAC, I also established a one-agent office at the Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) in Coleman, Florida.

  FCC Coleman featured two high security prisons, one medium security prison and one low security prison. There’s a population of over 7,000 prisoners, making it the largest Federal Bureau of Prisons complexes in the nation. The high-security prison has a few notable inmates, including Boston Organized Crime kingpin Whitey Bulger and Leonard Peltier, who in 1975 brutally murdered Jack Coler and Ron Williams, two FBI agents working at the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota. For those crimes, he’s serving two life sentences, plus an additional seven years for armed escape from the U.S. Pen in Lompoc, California.

  The SAC position came with a myriad of responsibilities. I oversaw the use of traditional and electronic collection, analysis, and reporting of intelligence information. That included overall management of all investigative programs, with a particular emphasis on counterterrorism and counterintelligence. I also was tasked with developing new partnerships within the public and private sector to enhance the division’s cybercrime program, and with enhancing liaison with executive management within federal, state, and local partner agencies to facilitate increased participation in the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Criminal Enterprise Investigation Task Force (a gang task force), and other investigations of mutual interest. While doing all of that, I also had to ensure that our white-collar crime program was aggressively pursuing health care fraud, insurance fraud, and public corruption initiatives. There were a host of other day-to-day responsibilities. I was a busy man. But I had the benefit of having great people addressing their day-to-day responsibilities.

  One indispensable person was my Secretary, Suzy Delpezzo. She always seemed to know exactly what was going on throughout the division, made sure I made deadlines and constantly helped me to prioritize my workload. Suzy really kept me informed and organized, as did then ASAC, now SAC Secretary, Carolyn McCormick. Suzy and Carolyn shared the traits of knowledge of the Bureau, great communication skills, and great
attitudes. I think those traits may be common for SAC’s secretaries throughout the FBI.

  Jacksonville, like each of the other 55 field offices in the FBI, was home to a Joint Terrorism Task Force. Jacksonville’s JTTF was unique in Florida due to its all-inclusive composition.

  The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) is set up much like the FBI, with SACs and ASACs in each of the FDLE’s seven divisions. Each of those seven FDLE divisions hosts a Domestic Security Task Force (DSTF). Established by an executive order of Governor Jeb Bush shortly after 9/11, the purpose of the DSTFs is to coordinate the state’s ability to investigate and respond to any terrorist threat or attack within the state, working with federal authorities. The DSTF combines the efforts of major state law enforcement and other emergency response agencies such as fire/rescue and health care organizations. Jacksonville is home to the only JTTF and DSTF combined into one unit. The group works together to conduct terrorism-related investigations. At the time of my retirement, an FBI supervisory special agent headed the task force’s day-to-day operation, and the assistant head of the task force was an FDLE supervisor.

  All members of the JTTF have Top Secret security clearances, participate in legal, operational, and firearms training together, and work as a team on all investigations. The overall operation, which was my responsibility as SAC, received oversight by an executive board made up of sheriffs, chiefs of police, and the other participating agencies’ SACs. It is a cost-effective and logical way to address counterterrorism investigations. It maximizes each agency’s limited resources. Agents, officers, and analysts are all privy to the same information, and there is much less chance for items slipping between the cracks.

  I went out of my way to promote the benefits and logic of the joint JTTF/DSSTF in my speaking engagements and when meeting with other law enforcement officials, but was nonetheless surprised in the Spring of 2005 when my efforts were recognized in a commendation presented to me by CIA Director Porter Goss in appreciation of my dedication and support to the shared Mission of the FBI and CIA.

  It is important that task forces addressing terrorism do not compete with one another. The information must be shared in a timely manner. That has not always been the case with task forces. For instance, often in communities where there are multiple drug task forces, the sharing of information that should occur simply does not. Sometimes, that’s the result of information just not reaching the right database; sometimes it has to do with an unhealthy competition between the task forces, where one is trying to better the other. No matter what the reason, not working together and sharing information is a cardinal sin and is still of concern since there are so many different agencies investigating terrorist-related matters. Petty jealousies and professional chauvinism cannot be allowed to get in the way of sharing information that may prevent a attack.

  As SAC in Jacksonville, I emphasized the importance of having a strong public corruption intelligence base. Outstanding cooperation between the FBI and FDLE resulted in several great public corruption cases, including the indictment of the head of the Florida Department of Corrections and several of his associates. We also had a prodigious asset forfeiture program, as being able to seize the assets of individuals who commit crimes is one of the best deterrents to crime in the FBI’s arsenal. Personnel of the Jacksonville Division, with the assistance of an outstanding asset forfeiture team, went the extra yard to include asset forfeiture as part and parcel of their investigations, and in my last fiscal year on the job (2005), more than $110 million in property and cash was seized for forfeiture in the Jacksonville Division.

  The job of the SAC is made much easier when competent assistant special agents in charge are present. I was very fortunate during my tenure as SAC to have very competent ASACs. Nelson Durate was the ASAC I worked with the longest in Jacksonville and he was intelligent, articulate and a real problem solver. It was a pleasure working with him. Just as important to an SAC is having a strong Chief Division Counsel. The CDC is an attorney who reports directly to the SAC and who provides guidance to the office on legal matters. In Jackson, as ASAC and acting SAC, I had Mike Turner as my CDC. As SAC in Jacksonville, I had Mike Perkins. Both were outstanding. On a daily basis, they delivered sound legal advice to the office and provided me with solid guidance on just about every subject imaginable, from questions concerning legal matters to sensitive personnel issues. It was my great fortune to work with such bright, talented, and nice people, and both helped me address a myriad of issues in an understandable and logical manner.

  I also had the benefit in Jacksonville of working with one of the best police/sheriffs departments in the nation. Sheriff John Rutherford was one of the most competent law enforcement officers with whom I have ever worked. Their department is the police department for Jacksonville, run by the elected sheriff. Jacksonville is, geographically, the largest city in the Continental United States and the department’s performance throughout that huge jurisdiction was admirable.

  During my stay in Jacksonville, I also worked with, and got to know, Ken Tucker, the SAC of the local Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). Ken went on from that position to be a Deputy Commissioner of FDLE and then the Secretary of Corrections for the state of Florida. Ken was a pleasure to work with and a truly professional law enforcement officer.

  I retired at the end of 2005 to move to Saint Petersburg so my wife and I could be closer to our three sons and their families. It was not an easy decision; I could have stayed three more years before mandatory retirement, but being near our kids and new grandson won out.

  With my time in the Navy, the NCIS, and the FBI, I retired with 31 years of service, and sticking around for another three years would not have made a significant difference in my retirement.

  People can be as critical as they want about the FBI. It’s healthy for the agency to be questioned. But, as critical as anyone may be, the FBI is still the premier law enforcement agency in the world. The many talented and selfless agents and support personnel of the Bureau certainly make mistakes, but the overall emphasis of just about everyone is to do the right thing. The FBI’s motto of “Fidelity,” “Bravery,” and “Integrity” is something most every agent continues to strive for and the American people are well served by such dedicated men and women. I will be forever proud and thankful to have been part of such a remarkable and outstanding organization.

  “INJUSTICE ANYWHERE IS A THREAT TO JUSTICE EVERYWHERE. WE ARE CAUGHT IN AN INESCAPABLE NETWORK OF MUTUALITY, TIED IN A SINGLE GARMENT OF DESTINY. WHATEVER AFFECTS ONE DIRECTLY, AFFECTS ALL INDIRECTLY.”

  - DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. ALABAMA 1963

  CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

  MY FRIEND, JAMES BAIN

  Late on the night of March 4, 1974, a nine-year-old Florida boy was abducted from his home, taken to a nearby field, and raped by an unknown male. The young victim described his assailant as a black man with bushy sideburns who said his name was Jimmy. Even though the victim couldn’t see the man’s face, the victim’s uncle, a local high school official, stated that the child’s description of “bushy sideburns” fit James Bain, a local high school student. (Details of the case provided by the Innocence Project of Florida.)

  After his uncle mentioned the name, it seems the young victim “adopted” Bain as the rapist. When the police arrived at Bain’s house, Bain was found at home with his sister where he had been since around 10:30 p.m., watching television. Although James Bain had an alibi and always maintained his innocence, police arrested him.

  After the victim had returned home and described the attacker, the police took him to the police station and presented him with a photo lineup. Bain’s photo was included in the lineup, along with four or five other males, only one of whom (Bain) had sideburns. Rather than asking the victim to pick out the photo of his assailant, the police suggestively and improperly instructed him to pick out Bain’s photo, and he did. It probably wasn’t hard to do,
as the victim’s uncle had shown him Bain’s photo in a high school yearbook!

  James Bain was charged with rape, breaking and entering, and kidnapping. In addition to the “eyewitness” identification, the State’s case was also based on serology tests on the victim’s underwear performed by the FBI, which concluded the semen in the victim’s underwear could have come from James Bain. The underwear itself was admitted at trial. A defense expert testified at trial, contrary to the FBI testimony, that the serological results revealed that Bain could not have been the depositor of the semen on the victim’s underwear.

  Serology testing performed before the trial by the FBI on the victim’s underwear verified that the rapist did deposit semen on the victim’s underwear, and the FBI saw sperm heads on the underwear. An FBI agent testified that the semen on the underwear was blood group B, that Bain’s blood group was AB (with a weak A), and that Bain could not be excluded as the depositor of the semen. Ultimately, DNA results now prove this FBI testimony to be demonstrably false.

  At trial, the State’s theory of the case was clear: the perpetrator who raped the victim ejaculated, depositing his semen and sperm onto the victim’s underwear—and that person was James Bain. The underwear was admitted into evidence at trial by the State solely for this purpose. DNA results now prove that the State’s theory, along with the evidence used to prove it, were simply wrong.

  Dr. Richard Jones, a defense expert, testified at trial that James Bain’s blood group was AB (with a strong A) leading to his conclusion, contrary to the FBI’s, that Bain could not have deposited the semen on the victim’s underwear. DNA results now prove Dr. Jones’s conclusion to be correct.