Fugitive Man Read online

  It’s one of the best skills any law enforcement officer can have: the ability to conduct a good, thorough interview. It’s about developing rapport, minimizing the crime, rationalizing the crime, and really listening to the subject to close the deal (getting the confession). And when you retire, you can always go into car sales.

  CHAPTER TWENTY

  9/11

  I was the acting Special Agent in Charge of the FBI in Mississippi on September 11, 2001.

  There are 56 field offices in the FBI, covering all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, other U.S. possessions, and Guam. Prior to 9/11, every FBI field office established its own priorities, based on the crime problems facing the division. Each field office routinely conducted crime surveys to gauge the various problems and establish justification for their crime problem rankings. That completely changed after 9/11.

  Robert Mueller had only been Director for a week or so when the terrorists attacked. The job of every Director of the FBI is very demanding. When the terrorists struck on 9/11, Robert Mueller’s job as Director became the most demanding of all. He had to change the focus and function of the FBI, a very difficult and demanding task. I believe that he will be remembered in history for the achievement of accomplishing that transition.

  Regardless of any faults of the Bureau, no agency in the world is better at addressing a major case and at solving crimes. The FBI is recognized as the premier investigative agency in the world and by any reasonable measure has lived up to that billing. Many police chiefs, superintendents, and Directors throughout the world will confirm that ranking. After 9/11, the FBI had to change its fundamental focus. It was no longer just the premier crime-solving organization; the number one new mission became preventing terrorism. The FBI still had to be the best at its investigative mission, and it still had to address the most significant crime problems facing the nation. In the midst of that sometimes-overwhelming task, the FBI’s foremost mission was to address terrorism, to prevent another 9/11. It was not an easy transition. I give Director Mueller a ton of credit for steering such a huge ship as the FBI and setting it on its new course.

  To that end, the FBI’s priorities at the time of my retirement were:

  Counterterrorism

  Counterintelligence

  Cybercrime

  Public Corruption

  Civil Rights

  Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises

  Combat major white-collar crime

  Combat significant violent crime

  Support federal, state, county, municipal, and international partners

  Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI’s mission

  I’ve recently seen the FBI’s new Mission Statement:

  “As an intelligence-driven and a threat-focused national security organization with both intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities, the mission of the FBI is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.”

  I believe the FBI’s priorities remain the same.

  One of the principal obstacles to the FBI’s success has been establishing a robust, nationwide intelligence apparatus. Prior to 9/11, for the majority of crimes, criminal intelligence development and collection was often local in nature, sometimes regional, but seldom national or international. Even when addressing organized crime, the data collected in the FBI’s Organized Crime Information System (OCIS) was primarily a collection of local information with limited linked analysis, except for that conducted on specific individuals and families, painstakingly put together by case agents and OCIS analysts. When the focus turned to preventing terrorism all that changed.

  If you remember what I said about our analyst cadre while I was the Chief of the Intelligence Development Unit, you’ll remember that many of our analysts were former secretaries or clerks who had performed well in those positions and had been rewarded for their good work by being promoted to analysts. I believe 9/11 made that practice finally come to an end, although it was a reluctant cessation. Suddenly, the vision that Jack Hunt and I had shared when he was chief of the Criminal Intelligence Section really made sense. Unrecognized until that time by many, it was clear we needed real analysts who were properly educated, trained, and equipped. We also needed to fix our information technology problems. I’ve heard that it remains a problem in the Bureau, but much has been accomplished. I’ve also been told that the Bureau is becoming a much more horizontal organization in the way it shares information and that the give and take between the Bureau, other law enforcement agencies, and the rest of the nation’s intelligence community has improved markedly.

  After 9/11, I heard many complaints asking why the FBI, CIA, and other intelligence gathering agencies were not sharing information prior to the attacks. I was not always privy to the entire global picture, but I know there was a heck of a lot of information being exchanged. I seemed to spend hours a day reviewing such material. However, from my perspective, there was not a central point where all intelligence was coordinated, analyzed, vetted and properly disseminated. One problem has to do with the types of intelligence the different agencies collected. Among other things, the CIA collects intelligence that influences public policy, allowing our political leaders to make informed decisions. The standard of proof or accuracy does not have to be the same as what the FBI traditionally requires. For the most part, the majority of FBI agents had been accustomed to collecting intelligence necessary to establish probable cause and looking to put together material that would be admissible in court. It’s like apples and oranges. The logical blending of the two has been a challenging transition.

  One component critical to the success the FBI has experienced since 9/11, and there have been many successful moments, was the establishment of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) in every field office. The amount of work accomplished since 9/11 is staggering and could not have been completed without the cooperation of the various state, local, and federal agencies working together on those task forces. The establishment of all those task forces was not an easy task, but fortunately, the foundation for many of those task forces was already in place due to the prior establishment of Safe Streets Violent Crime Task Forces throughout the nation, many of which are still functioning.

  While in Jackson, after 9/11, we quickly established a command center to prioritize and address terrorism-related leads. It was a busy time, and there were well over a thousand Mississippi leads covered in a short time. In the midst of covering the leads, we worked with state and local officials to insure appropriate plans were in place for potential incidents of terrorism and the handling of weapons of mass destruction. It was a hectic few months.

  Because of these new challenges, I took an action that caused some disfavor for me with the troops in Jackson. I spoke with one of our analysts, who had never been formerly trained as an analyst, telling her that I had arranged for her to attend a five-week analyst training school at the National Drug Intelligence Center in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. This employee was very well liked and a hard worker. She did a great job of delivering subpoenas and returning the subpoenaed telephone records to the requesting agents. She was not, however, doing much in the way of real analyst work. She told me, “Mr. Cromwell, if you insist that I go to that school, I’ll retire.” I told her that she needed to be trained and hoped she would accept the new challenge. She didn’t. She retired, and I know many people in the office couldn’t understand why I just didn’t leave well enough alone.

  One of the leads turned into a case involving a large tugboat pushing a dozen barges down the Mississippi River. One afternoon, as a couple of the tugboat’s crewmembers were on deck, a low flyi
ng crop duster passed over them. They reported that, when they waved, the crop duster sprayed something on them. Immediately, the tug and barges were quarantined. The Coast Guard responded, along with FEMA, the EPA, and the Center for Disease Control. The crew was quarantined and decontaminated. The vessel was examined for foreign substances. None were found. All crop dusters in Mississippi were grounded, and the search began for the pilot in question. He was not easy to find. I think that he probably read about the quarantine and suspected he was the reason every crop duster in the State was grounded. He may have feared for his life.

  A lot of legwork by several agents turned the guy up in Arkansas. He had flown crop dusters for more than 20 years, and whenever anyone waved to him, he was in the habit of “blowing smoke” at them. It was a friendly habit. The crop duster had smoke emitters used for measuring a field’s wind flow and direction. Until 9/11, it was a harmless way of saying hello. When people waved, he just hit the smoke button for a couple seconds. I doubt he does that anymore. “Blowing smoke” to say hello cost him, or his crop dusting company, a lot of money, as they were charged with the cost of the decontamination and quarantine.

  Another “hot” matter came in one morning when two employees of a business took sick after being exposed to a suspicious white powder on their keyboards. Following a quick, thorough investigation, featuring personnel in Hazmat suits and the evacuation of everyone nearby, the suspicious white powder was definitively identified as powdered sugar off Krispy Kreme donuts consumed by the two earlier in the morning. However, just the thought of being exposed to a “suspicious white powder” was enough to make the two employees ill.

  There were plenty of serious leads though, and the FBI personnel throughout the state worked long hours to professionally cover all leads and preserve the safety of Mississippi’s citizens.

  After three busy years in Mississippi, I was promoted by Director Robert Mueller to the FBI’s Senior Executive Service and was made Chief of the Applicant Processing Section.

  CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

  APPLICANT SECTION

  I spent a little more than two years as the chief of the FBI’s Applicant Section at FBIHQ in Washington. During that time, I also spent a few months as the acting Deputy Assistant Director of the Administrative Services Division, a job that included serving as the entire Bureau’s Personnel Officer. It was interesting and sometimes labor intensive addressing personnel issues for an organization with over 30,000 employees. Every day brought unique personnel situations to address. It was a busy and eye-opening few months.

  As chief of the Applicant Section, I led about 500 people in five units: the Recruiting Unit, the Testing Unit, the Special Agent and Support Applicant Unit, the Special Inquiries and General Background Investigation Unit (SPIN Unit), and the Background Investigation Contract Services Unit. As I learned in Houston, the SPIN Unit managed background investigations of individuals who had been nominated by the President for positions requiring Senate confirmation. The SPINs were always high profile and were handled throughout the Bureau with very high priority. Every Monday, I had to insure the director’s office was updated on the status of all pending White House appointment investigations. Fortunately for the FBI, and me I had Linda McKetney, an outstanding unit chief, leading the SPIN Unit, and the unit always stayed on top of its game.

  The Background Investigation Contract Services (BICS) Unit, competently led by Chief Maurice Hayes, managed the activities of hundreds of retired agents across the country conducting background investigations for the FBI. The majority were retired FBI agents, but retired agents from other agencies, such as the Secret Service, ICE, and NCIS, also handled many investigations. The use of retired agents freed up tens of thousands of agent hours for the FBI, and the retired agents consistently conducted thorough investigations and provided detailed, well-written reports.

  After 9/11, the FBI was granted authority to hire over 900 critically skilled special agents. I arrived at FBIHQ shortly after Congress had given that authority to the Bureau. In nine months, we tested over 14,000 qualified applicants, interviewed over 4,000 of those tested, and hired 998 new special agents. The intake and initial processing of applications in a timely manner was critical to meeting the hiring goal. In the not too distant past, when an applicant filled out an application to be a special agent, the application was prepared on paper, mailed to FBIHQ, and forwarded for initial screening and vetting to the field office responsible for the area where the applicant was residing. It was cumbersome and time-consuming, as most applicants did not make it past the initial screening.

  Unit Chief Joe Bross, Unit Chief Harry Bowen, Supervisor Gwen Hubbard, and the great people in the Applicant Testing and Recruiting Units, working with several other FBI employees and, most importantly, a private vendor, put together an online employment application system that quickly and automatically performed the initial screening of applicants and enabled field offices to directly download the applications of qualified candidates who resided in their territory.

  The importance of that automation cannot be overstated. It was absolutely critical to the FBI meeting its hiring goal. As it came on line, Joe Bross was in frequent contact with the private vendor handling the project and was able to tweak the website to best meet their needs. The difference between working with government IT people and the private sector was so very clear to me during those times. When we found a piece of our system online that required modification, we called the vendor, and the modification was addressed with a sense of urgency and accomplished overnight. FBI IT personnel simply did not possess the manpower to be so responsive. The private sector is profit-motivated and does what it has to do to meet its goal.

  From my perspective, our major shortfall was not in finding qualified and critically skilled candidates. We had an abundance of them though they were predominately white and male. Our failing was in not finding qualified candidates of other demographic groups, and we were not doing well at recruiting applicants with Arabic and other Middle Eastern language skills.

  If you ask 100 nine or ten-year-old white boys if they think that being an FBI agent would be cool, most will say yes. If you ask 100 African American, Asian, Latino, or Middle Eastern American nine or ten-year-old boys, you won’t get nearly the same response. The same thing applies to young girls, no matter what their race. Being an FBI special agent is not something that is part of most young women’s dreams. These young people typically saw few role models in the FBI who looked like them, or shared their experiences. It’s unlikely that the adults in their lives encouraged them to think about becoming an FBI agent.

  Director Mueller recognized the importance of diversity in our ranks, and monitored hiring statistics closely. With his support, we conducted numerous recruiting initiatives aimed at women and people of color. While we gave it a good try, the FBI could certainly do better.

  Additionally, Director Louis Freeh had the foresight to grow the FBI’s overseas presence substantially during his tenure, a move critical to the FBI’s success in countering terrorism and addressing other significant matters. With more and more of the FBI’s focus on foreign/international matters, the need for diversity within the FBI’s agent ranks is greater than ever.

  The lack of diversity within the ranks of the FBI represents an operational shortcoming. The widely accepted corporate argument for diversity predicts a more efficient and functional organization when the organization reflects its customer base. That is particularly true when diversity is applied to the jobs with the most public contact, such as sales, customer service, etc. The sales force that reflects the customer base successfully closes more deals, which equates with more profit. The corporate diversity argument is even more critical for the FBI and others in law enforcement.

  The FBI’s bottom line is not expressed in profit or loss. The FBI’s bottom line involves success in preventing terrorist attacks, catching spies, solving major crimes, and saving lives. I
f the agent population of the FBI more closely matched the racial and cultural makeup of the U.S., the FBI would be better positioned to succeed; there would be more crimes solved, and there would be more success at preventing acts of terrorism.

  Consider the basics of the interview: the first thing the investigator must do is develop rapport. In order to do this, it is helpful to be familiar with the person’s culture. It also is critical to be able to speak the interviewee’s language.

  While it is often easier for people of one demographic group to make a meaningful connection with a peer who shares the same background, we would oversimplify the issue if we concluded that this would be all it takes to achieve success. Rather, if the FBI were to have a more proportional representation, the day-to-day interaction between both the agent and support populations would result in the exposure of everyone to the cultural differences of a variety of distinct groups and demonstrate the many similarities between all people, as well. In such a diverse FBI, cultural awareness/ familiarity would breed a better and more efficient pool of investigators.